A conversation with Tim Hwang about historical simulations, the interaction of policy and science, analogies between research ecosystems and the economy, and so much more. 

Topics

• Historical Simulations
• Macroscience
• Macro-metrics for science
• Long science
• The interaction between science and policy
• Creative destruction in research
• "Regulation" for scientific markets
• Indicators for the health of a field or science as a whole
• "Metabolism of Science"
• Science rotation programs
• Clock speeds of Regulation vs Clock Speeds of Technology

References

• Macroscience Substack
• Ada Palmer's Papal Simulation
• Think Tank Tycoon
• Universal Paperclips (Paperclip maximizer html game)
• Pitt Rivers Museum

 

Transcript

[00:02:02 ] Ben: Wait, so tell me more about the historical LARP that you're doing. Oh,

[00:02:07 ] Tim: yeah. So this comes from like something I've been thinking about for a really long time, which is You know in high school, I did model UN and model Congress, and you know, I really I actually, this is still on my to do list is to like look into the back history of like what it was in American history, where we're like, this is going to become an extracurricular, we're going to model the UN, like it has all the vibe of like, after World War II, the UN is a new thing, we got to teach kids about international institutions.

Anyways, like, it started as a joke where I was telling my [00:02:35 ] friend, like, we should have, like, model administrative agency. You know, you should, like, kids should do, like, model EPA. Like, we're gonna do a rulemaking. Kids need to submit. And, like, you know, there'll be Chevron deference and you can challenge the rule.

And, like, to do that whole thing. Anyways, it kind of led me down this idea that, like, our, our notion of simulation, particularly for institutions, is, like, Interestingly narrow, right? And particularly when it comes to historical simulation, where like, well we have civil war reenactors, they're kind of like a weird dying breed, but they're there, right?

But we don't have like other types of historical reenactments, but like, it might be really valuable and interesting to create communities around that. And so like I was saying before we started recording, is I really want to do one that's a simulation of the Cuban Missile Crisis. But like a serious, like you would like a historical reenactment, right?

Yeah. Yeah. It's like everybody would really know their characters. You know, if you're McNamara, you really know what your motivations are and your background. And literally a dream would be a weekend simulation where you have three teams. One would be the Kennedy administration. The other would be, you know, Khrushchev [00:03:35 ] and the Presidium.

And the final one would be the, the Cuban government. Yeah. And to really just blow by blow, simulate that entire thing. You know, the players would attempt to not blow up the world, would be the idea.

[00:03:46 ] Ben: I guess that's actually the thing to poke, in contrast to Civil War reenactment. Sure, like you know how

[00:03:51 ] Tim: that's gonna end.

Right,

[00:03:52 ] Ben: and it, I think it, that's the difference maybe between, in my head, a simulation and a reenactment, where I could imagine a simulation going

[00:04:01 ] Tim: differently. Sure, right.

[00:04:03 ] Ben: Right, and, and maybe like, is the goal to make sure the same thing happened that did happen, or is the goal to like, act? faithfully to

[00:04:14 ] Tim: the character as possible.

Yeah, I think that's right, and I think both are interesting and valuable, right? But I think one of the things I'm really interested in is, you know, I want to simulate all the characters, but like, I think one of the most interesting things reading, like, the historical record is just, like, operating under deep uncertainty about what's even going on, right?

Like, for a period of time, the American [00:04:35 ] government is not even sure what's going on in Cuba, and, like, you know, this whole question of, like, well, do we preemptively bomb Cuba? Do we, we don't even know if the, like, the warheads on the island are active. And I think I would want to create, like, similar uncertainty, because I think that's where, like, that's where the strategic vision comes in, right?

That, like, you have the full pressure of, like, Maybe there's bombs on the island. Maybe there's not even bombs on the island, right? And kind of like creating that dynamic. And so I think simulation is where there's a lot, but I think Even reenactment for some of these things is sort of interesting. Like, that we talk a lot about, like, oh, the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Or like, the other joke I had was like, we should do the Manhattan Project, but the Manhattan Project as, like, historical reenactment, right? And it's kind of like, you know, we have these, like, very, like off the cuff or kind of, like, stereotype visions of how these historical events occur. And they're very stylized.

Yeah, exactly, right. And so the benefit of a reenactment that is really in detail Yeah. is like, oh yeah, there's this one weird moment. You know, like that, that ends up being really revealing historical examples. And so even if [00:05:35 ] you can't change the outcome, I think there's also a lot of value in just doing the exercise.

Yeah. Yeah. The, the thought of

[00:05:40 ] Ben: in order to drive towards this outcome that I know. Actually happened I wouldn't as the character have needed to do X. That's right That's like weird nuanced unintuitive thing,

[00:05:50 ] Tim: right? Right and there's something I think about even building into the game Right, which is at the very beginning the Russians team can make the decision on whether or not they've even actually deployed weapons into the cube at all, yeah, right and so like I love that kind of outcome right which is basically like And I think that's great because like, a lot of this happens on the background of like, we know the history.

Yeah. Right? And so I think like, having the team, the US team put under some pressure of uncertainty. Yeah. About like, oh yeah, they could have made the decision at the very beginning of this game that this is all a bluff. Doesn't mean anything. Like it's potentially really interesting and powerful, so.

[00:06:22 ] Ben: One precedent I know for this completely different historical era, but there's a historian, Ada Palmer, who runs

[00:06:30 ] Tim: a simulation of a people election in her class every year. That's so good. [00:06:35 ] And

[00:06:36 ] Ben: it's, there, you know, like, it is not a simulation.

[00:06:40 ] Tim: Or,

[00:06:41 ] Ben: sorry, excuse me, it is not a reenactment. In the sense that the outcome is indeterminate.

[00:06:47 ] Tim: Like, the students

[00:06:48 ] Ben: can determine the outcome. But... What tends to happen is like structural factors emerge in the sense that there's always a war. Huh. The question is who's on which sides of the war? Right, right. And what do the outcomes of the war actually entail? That's right. Who

[00:07:05 ] Tim: dies? Yeah, yeah. And I

[00:07:07 ] Ben: find that that's it's sort of Gets at the heart of the, the great

[00:07:12 ] Tim: man theory versus the structural forces theory.

That's right. Yeah. Like how much can these like structural forces actually be changed? Yeah. And I think that's one of the most interesting parts of the design that I'm thinking about right now is kind of like, what are the things that you want to randomize to impose different types of like structural factors that could have been in that event?

Right? Yeah. So like one of the really big parts of the debate at XCOM in the [00:07:35 ] early phases of the Cuban Missile Crisis is You know, McNamara, who's like, right, he runs the Department of Defense at the time. His point is basically like, look, whether or not you have bombs in Cuba or you have bombs like in Russia, the situation has not changed from a military standpoint.

Like you can fire an ICBM. It has exactly the same implications for the U. S. And so his, his basically his argument in the opening phases of the Cuban Missile Crisis is. Yeah. Which is actually pretty interesting, right? Because that's true. But like, Kennedy can't just go to the American people and say, well, we've already had missiles pointed at us.

Some more missiles off, you know, the coast of Florida is not going to make a difference. Yeah. And so like that deep politics, and particularly the politics of the Kennedy administration being seen as like weak on communism. Yeah. Is like a huge pressure on all the activity that's going on. And so it's almost kind of interesting thinking about the Cuban Missile Crisis, not as like You know us about to blow up the world because of a truly strategic situation but more because of like the local politics make it so diff